Go to AfricaBib home

Go to AfricaBib home AfricaBib Go to database home

bibliographic database
Line
Previous page New search

The free AfricaBib App for Android is available here

Periodical article Periodical article Leiden University catalogue Leiden University catalogue WorldCat catalogue WorldCat
Title:Redesigning conditionality
Authors:Collier, PaulISNI
Guillaumont, PatrickISNI
Guillaumont, SylvianeISNI
Year:1997
Periodical:World Development
Volume:25
Issue:9
Pages:1399-1407
Language:English
Geographic term:Africa
Subjects:economic policy
development cooperation
External link:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(97)00053-3
Abstract:Conditionality has been used to induce reform in developing countries, particularly in Africa. The disappointing results of this approach have led to a gradual redesign of donors' aid contracts, towards a shorter period and more detailed conditions. The logical conclusion of this approach is for reforms to be priced piecemeal. The pricing of reforms is the extreme form of the inducement objective of conditionality. The authors argue that this is in conflict with four other objectives, selectivity, paternalism, restraint and signalling. The criteria for aid allocation which they propose are consistent with three of these. The allocation of aid on the basis of a retrospective assessment of major outcomes such as growth would concentrate aid in those countries in which it is likely to be most effective, thus meeting the objective of selectivity. By relinquishing the objective of inducement and hence the very public conflicts of priorities, it becomes possible for donors to be invited by governments to function as agencies of restraint. Finally, because aid would follow economic performance it would signal that performance. This may assist in attracting private capital to the best-performing African economies some years earlier than would otherwise be the case. Bibliogr., notes, ref., sum.
Views
Cover