| Abstract: | The article first examinee the situation in Nigeria as a tragic object-lesson in the problem of violence in the Third World, with special reference to the traffic in conventional arms. The Nigerian army was a model internal security army, but it was never intended to act as a conventional war machine. It is unreasonable to castigate the British Government for not having supplied offensive weapons to the Nigerian Federal Government in the war against Biafra. The short-term gains of conventional arms sales throughout the Third World are almost invariably outweighed by long-term dangers, which are discussed in the article. Developing countries should concentrate on building up an effective internal security force, preferably with backing from friendly Powers with more experience. British policy should be to help others to help themselves, which policy should extend to emergencies, and cater for situations such as Nigeria's time of travail before the war. Here British Government's record seems to be open to criticism. |