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Title: | Constitutional Alternatives for the Regulation of Ethnic Politics? Institution-Building Principles in Uganda's and South Africa's Transitions |
Author: | Carbone, Giovanni M. |
Year: | 2001 |
Periodical: | Journal of Contemporary African Studies |
Volume: | 19 |
Issue: | 2 |
Period: | July |
Pages: | 229-252 |
Language: | English |
Geographic terms: | Uganda South Africa |
Subjects: | democracy constitutional reform Politics and Government Law, Human Rights and Violence Ethnic and Race Relations |
External links: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589000120066470 http://ejournals.ebsco.com/direct.asp?ArticleID=EQC2CJGUDE3DBKPXPC7F |
Abstract: | Uganda and South Africa have both come to be regarded as potential models for an African way to democracy. Both countries undertook critical constitutional changes between 1989 and 1996. But in spite of their logically similar starting points (the common need to overcome past ethnic or ethno-racial conflicts) they have achieved very different politico-institutional outcomes in their transitional arrangements: a 'consociational' party-based versus a Movement or 'no-party' democracy. In South Africa, ethnic or ethno-racial identities were implicitly but extensively acknowledged as a potential focus of distinct interests and political demands. The institutional framework for the 1994-1999 transition implied that political access could possibly be mediated by communal identities, territories and organizations. Notably, political parties were strongly recognized as the very building blocks of the new regime, as it was widely held that they might emerge as representatives of distinct communities. By contrast, the origin of Uganda's political system was marked by the alleged need to keep ethnic and religious identities out of politics. The current arrangements essentially reject communal groups as a legitimate basis for State institutions (such as federal subunits) or political parties, a deliberate reaction to a history of violent conflicts fostered by ethnically based politics. The cornerstone of such a framework is a ban on most activities of political parties. Thus, the formal political institutions that the two countries devised for transition embody two opposite 'institution-building principles' which tend to protect, in one case, or to inhibit, in the other, the possible elevation of ethnic identities to the realm of politics. Bibliogr., notes, ref. |