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Periodical article |
| Title: | Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-Evidence from Senegal |
| Authors: | Platteau, Jean-Philippe Strzalecki, Tomasz |
| Year: | 2004 |
| Periodical: | Journal of African Economies |
| Volume: | 13 |
| Issue: | 3 |
| Pages: | 417-445 |
| Language: | English |
| Geographic term: | Senegal |
| Subjects: | social conflicts fishermen economic models Economics and Trade |
| External link: | https://jae.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/3/417.full.pdf |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the importance of expectations for interaction between groups with different identities. In Senegal, the authors encountered a puzzling situation: two groups of fishermen, a minority group of migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis and a majority group of native fishermen, did not share the same degree of optimism regarding the chances of success of a joint collective action in one area (Kayar), while expectations of the same two groups regarding the same collective action were similar in another area (Soumbedioune). Understanding this contrast and its implications provides the main justification for the paper. The collective action concerned the formation of a cartel aimed at reducing the market power of local fish merchants or commission agents. To be able to account for the contrast between the two areas, pessimistic expectations in the first area have to be traced back to a preceding conflict that could never be settled satisfactorily. A perverse path-dependent process had thus been set in motion that could not be changed by a simple act of will of a determined leadership. To demonstrate the links between expectations and actions that fit with the story told, the authors propose a simple model of collective action with asymmetric information. Data for the study were collected between April and June 1997. Bibliogr., notes, sum. [Journal abstract] |