| Abstract: | It is generally acknowledged that central bank independence (CBI) has become an important institutional feature and accepted element of good practice in central banking. Consequently, scores of central banks have amended their charters accordingly. However, CBI on its own may be challenged and vulnerable if not rooted in strong democratic institutions and if not supported by a culture of respect for the judicial system. This paper applies a collection of legal, political and economic CBI criteria to the central banks of three countries selected on historical grounds, namely the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), and the Bank of England. It shows that all three banks have a relatively high CBI, but are not on par with the benchmark of excellence in this regard. The SARB has a relatively strong CBI, but its charter needs improvement in terms of strengthening its stipulation on the provision of finance to government and the absence of a clear, transparent and democratic ruling on the dismissal of top officials. Bibliogr., sum. in English and Afrikaans, text in Afrikaans. [Journal abstract, edited] |
Africana Periodical Literature 
Periodical article
Leiden University catalogue
WorldCat
