Trading coups for civil war: the strategic logic of tolerating rebellion

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Periodical article

Title:	Trading coups for civil war: the strategic logic of tolerating rebellion
Author:	Powell, Jonathan M.
Year:	2014
Periodical:	African Security Review (ISSN 2154-0128)
Volume:	23
Issue:	4
Pages:	329-338
Language:	English
Geographic term:	Africa
Subjects:	coups d'état military regimes civil wars rebellions
External link:	https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2014.944196
Abstract:	This article investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the article offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While 'coup-proofing' practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of 'coup-proofing' counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to - or can even potentially benefit from - the existence of an insurgency. Notes, ref., sum. [Journal abstract]